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The article focuses on the issue of brain determinism, by examining two recent neuroscien-
tific experiments (Libet’s and Haynes’ experiments about conscious acts). Such experiments 
aim to show a cerebral determination of the agent’s free choices. The author argues that 
even if their conclusions were true, that would not eliminate the common use of the concept 






In the marvellous philosophical Epilogue of War and Peace, Lev Tolstoy gives 
the following account of the issue of free will: “The problem is that regarding 
man as a subject of observation from whatever point of view - theological, his-
torical, ethical, or philosophical - we find a general law of necessity to which he 
(like all that exists) is subject. But regarding him from within ourselves as 
what we are conscious of, we feel ourselves to be free. […] However often ex-
periment and reasoning may show a man that under the same conditions and 
with the same character he will do the same thing as before, yet when under 
the same conditions and with the same character he approaches for the thou-
sandth time the action that always ends in the same way, he feels as certainly 
convinced as before the experiment that he can act as he pleases.” 
Nowadays the issue of free is still debated along similar lines: on the one 
hand we have the scientific investigation, which assumes that there is a deter-
ministic relationship between events; on the other hand we have the manifest 
image, our feeling and thinking of ourselves as free to choose otherwise. 
 However, this contrast is still not sufficient if we wish to highlight a real 
problem. Borrowing another image from Tolstoy’s Epilogue, there is still a ten-
sion between the geocentric astronomical theory, which is the manifest image, 
the common sense image, and the Copernican theory; yet this tension is not 
perceived by anyone as a difficulty. The problem in relation to free will arises 
because, unlike for astronomy, there are not scientific or philosophical argu-
ments that conclusively solve the question. That is to say, the arguments that 
are brought forward as solutions of the problem remain speculative, mere theo-
retical hypotheses, not susceptible to empirical confirmation, nor immune to 




philosophical counter-arguments. Yet, according to some scholars, the above 
would no longer be true, as recent neuroscientific discoveries have lead us to 
the conclusion that even the choice between determinism and free will is like 
the choice between Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy. 
 
 
1. Determinism and free will  
 
As a first step it is useful to define the main concepts involved. Generally 
speaking, determinism claims that each event is determined by the occurrence 
of sufficient conditions for its happening. Depending on how these sufficient 
conditions are interpreted, determinism can take several forms: theological de-
terminism, logical determinism, causal determinism, and so on. “Determina-
tion is thus a kind of conditional necessity that can be described in various 
ways”1.  
In a broad sense, therefore, determinism claims that: an event B is deter-
mined if and only if there is an event A, such that necessarily if A occurs, then 
B occurs. In modal logic: ∀B, ∃A Nec (A→Β). 
Roughly, causal determinism maintains that an event is determined by a 
cause. Usually, the concept of event is interpreted as including external phe-
nomena and movements of the body as well as thoughts and mental states, 
and the concept of cause is interpreted as a sufficient condition that happens 
before the occurrence of the event2 In this way, whenever the cause occurs, the 
effect occurs (without excluding, however, that it may also occur under other 
conditions: it is a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one). Moreover, a 
cause can be an event (or a sequence of events) of different types: physical, 
chemical, biological, psychological, and so on; thus we can speak of physical 
determinism, chemical determinism, biological determinism, psychological de-
terminism, and so on. 
 In order to avoid the difficult notion of a cause, Peter Van Inwagen prefers 
another formulation of determinism, with a different terminology, and replaces 
the concepts of “cause”, “effect” and “event” with the concepts of “state of the 
world”, “instant of time” and “laws of nature”3. According to this formulation, 
determinism claims that: a state of the world, B, at time t1 necessarily follows 
from the state of the world, A, at  time t0, in connection with the laws of na-
ture. In modal logic: Nec ((A ∧ L) → B).  
However, it is not only the concept of determinism that needs clarification; 
the concept of free will also requires further analysis. It would be a mistake to 
think that it consists only in the opposition to determinism, in the mere identi-
                                                          
1 Kane 2002, p. 6. 
2 For an useful analysis of the notion of cause, see Honderich 1988, cap. 1. 
3 See Van Inwagen 1983, pp. 58 ff. 
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fication with indeterminism, with the lack of determination of the will. Lack of 
determination is not the same as freedom, but as chance, as Hume already 
said. Even if indeterminism were to be confirmed by scientific evidence, that 
would not mean that we could automatically infer the existence of free will: an 
uncaused act is not a free act, but an accidental act, completely unrelated to 
the agent’s previous actions and choices, to his or her character and personal-
ity. Therefore, the terms involved are threefold: determination, chance and 
freedom. 
 This gives rise to a problem of intelligibility of the notion of free will in re-
lation to that of chance, which has led to the identification of at least two fea-
tures, only the first of which is implied in the notion of chance4:  
a) the existence of alternate possibilities: the possibility to want or choose 
otherwise, differently from the way we actually want or choose. The agent who 
wants in just one possible way and has no other options available is not a free 
agent.  
b) The agent’s control over choice. That is to say, the choice has to happen 
in the subject (as the origin and ultimate source of it) and be under his control, 
because it is determined by internal factors (endogenous), and not by external 
conditions (exogenous) that the agent cannot control. Such a condition is not 
observed by chance. The will must then be in our power, up to us. As someone 
has pointed out, the problem of free will is “the issue of how much control over 
our own actions, and so over our own lives, the extrapolitical world - the natu-
ral (and perhaps also the supernatural) world – affords us”5.  
 
 
2. Brain determinism: Libet’s and Haynes’ experiments  
 
In recent years, many scholars have emphasized that the sciences studying the 
functioning of the human brain (neurophysics, neurochemistry, neurobiology, 
etc.) would lead us to a deterministic view. Scientific analysis of the brain 
shows that the behavior of brain cells, neurons, is completely determined: each 
neuron receives electrochemical inputs from its roots, called ‘dendrites’, and re-
lays outputs of the same nature, through a trunk, called ‘axon’, which ends in 
connection with the roots of other neurons, called ‘synapses’. The synapses 
stimulate or inhibit the activity of other neurons through the release of chemi-
cal elements, called ‘neurotransmitters’, which control the passage of electrical 
impulses to other synapses. Each thought or mental activity involves millions 
of neurons, but this would be completely determined by physical and chemical 
laws6. 
                                                          
4 See Watson 1987, p.145. 
5 Ekstrom 2000, p. 3. 
6 See Honderich 1993. 




 The subjective awareness of free will, the inner experience of freedom that 
we have as agents would therefore be misleading, and not supported by reli-
able scientific data. It would be nothing more than an illusion, although it 
plays an important role in common daily interactions, and can itself be ex-
plained by physical and natural parameters. Something similar, as it was said, 
to the geocentric astronomical view. 
  
Such a theory was often held over the centuries by determinist philosophers. 
What is new today is that this theory seems to be confirmed by some relevant 
neuroscientific experiments, that, according to someone, would definitively 
solve the problem. Two experiments, in particular.  
The first one is an experiment on voluntary actions (spontaneous actions 
that the subject feels under his own control) proposed by Benjamin Libet. The 
experiment shows that these kinds of actions are accompanied, in the cerebral 
cortex, by an electrical activity that precedes the time when the subject be-
comes aware of his or her own decisions7. Electrical brain activity of the cere-
bral cortex is recorded while subjects are asked to move a hand as soon as they 
feel the urge to do so, remembering the time of conscious decision by observing 
the dial of a special clock 25 times faster than a normal clock. This action is 
preceded, by 1000 to 550 milliseconds, by a negative brain potential (the so 
called ‘readiness potential’), that originates from the brain area involved in 
motor preparation: supplementary motor area (SMA). The subject, however, 
becomes aware of his or her own decision only about 400 milliseconds before 
the act, and therefore only after the onset of readiness potential in that area. 
 The experiment would show that the brain has taken its decision before the 
person becomes aware of it. As Libet writes: “the initiation of the freely volun-
tary act appears to begin in the brain unconsciously, well before the person 
consciously knows he wants to act!”8 
 However, Libet’s experiment does not solve any problems. First of all, the 
readiness potential is generated by ‘supplementary motor area’ (SMA), but 
more fundamental planning stages might be involved in other areas of the 
cerebral cortex. Moreover, the time delay between the onset of readiness po-
tential and the subject’s awareness is very short, and it could lead to measure-
ment inaccuracies. Finally, since in the experiment there is no choice between 
different options of action (but only between moving or not moving the hand), 
the readiness potential might be a merely unspecific preparatory activation, 
and not be related to the outcome of the choice. Instead, we would consider it 
related to the that outcome if it enabled us to foresee it. 
                                                          
7 See Libet-Gleason-Wright-Pearl 1983. For a general account of the neuroscientific analysis 
of free will, see Libet-Freeman-Sutherland 1999. 
8 Libet 2002, p. 555. 
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In order to solve these problems John-Dylan Haynes and others have re-
cently proposed a more accurate test, which would validate the results of 
Libet’s experiment. Whereas a letter stream updated every half second is 
shown to the subjects, they are asked to consciously choose whether to press a 
left or a right button by using the corresponding index fingers. Subjects are 
asked to indicate the time of their motor decision, while remembering which 
letter was presented when they consciously took their motor decision. Sophis-
ticated neuro-imaging techniques (functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
fMRI) enables us to measure brain activity of various brain regions and to lo-
cate it with good precision.  
The experiment shows that there are two other brain’s regions that present 
electric activity before the agent’s conscious choice, and the observation of 
which zone of each of the two regions is involved enables us to foresee which 
choice will be made. The first is a part of the frontal cortex (the frontopolar 
cortex), in which there is a predictive information preceding the conscious mo-
tor decision by up to 10 seconds, the second is a part of the parietal cortex (an 
area between the precuneus and the posterior cingulate cortex) that shows 
predictive activity after the activation of the frontal cortex. The supplemen-
tary motor area, SMA, is involved only later. 
 According to its authors, the experiment “suggests that when the subject’s 
decision reached awareness it had been influenced by unconscious brain activ-
ity for up to 10 s” and provides “a tentative causal model of information flow, 
where the earliest unconscious precursors of the motor decision originated in 
frontopolar cortex, from where they influenced the buildup of decision-related 
information in the precuneus and later in SMA, where it remained unconscious 
for up to a few seconds”9. 
 Haynes’ experiment seems to overcome the weaknesses of Libet’s experi-
ment. It allows to identify high-levels motor control regions, which are more 
fundamental than SMA; to record a much longer time between brain activity 
and awareness of decision, so reducing timing inaccuracies in reporting the on-
set of awareness; and, above all, it allows to foresee what will be the outcome 
of the subject’s actual choice, that appears to be determined by specific areas 
of the prefrontal cortex. 
According to both experiments, therefore, subjective awareness arises only 
after an unconscious brain decision process has started, and that would ex-
clude the role of conscience in choosing. The choice seems to be determined by 
electro-chemical factors outside the intentional control of the subject. So, the 
agent would not have any control over his choices and these would not have 
alternate possibilities (the conditions of human free will, as we have seen). 
  
                                                          
9 Soon-Brass-Hainze-Haynes 2008, p. 3. 





3. Brain determination and compatibilism  
 
A debate about the interpretation of the two experiments has been going on 
for several years now. Both experiments admit interpretations that would 
eventually save the notion of free will. It might be argued, for example, that 
the experimenter excessively determines the type of choice available to the 
agents; that the type of choices required by the experimenters is not analogous 
to common choices, intrinsically related to preferences and reasons; that even 
the agents’ usual choices are not always conscious; that the cerebral causal 
connections are very complex, and so on. Libet himself has brought forward an 
interpretation of his experiment that does not completely eliminate free will, 
for it gives to the agent the power to stop the execution of the choice: the 
choice would be determined by cerebral activity, but the agent could stop the 
execution of it. There would be no free will, therefore, but something as a free 
veto: “the conscious veto may not require or be the direct result of preceding 
unconscious processes. The conscious veto is a control function different from 
simply becoming aware of the wish to act”10 (assuming, implausibly, that the 
veto awareness should not be preceded by any readiness potential). 
What should be stressed, however, is that, even if we admit that those ex-
periments actually show a cerebral determination of choice and exclude the 
role of subjective consciousness in the decision, they cannot exclude free will, 
and the related concepts of control and alternate possibilities. Analogously, 
they do not result in a disregard of the difference between situations where this 
freedom actually appears to exist and situations where it does not appear to 
exist. In other words, they do not invalidate the claim that cerebral determi-
nation is compatible with free will. At least they do not invalidate it in a 
weaker sense of the term ‘free will’, which is sufficient, however, to preserve 
the meaning of the expressions commonly associated with it: "I can choose 
freely", "I could have chosen otherwise", and so on.  
If we keep this weaker sense of the term, free will means the possession of 
two requirements existing even in the presence of a cerebral determination of 
choice. The first requirement is the absence of external coercion to choose, 
namely the opportunity to choose according to one’s own preferences (along the 
lines of the more widespread and ancient form of compatibilism, dating at least 
to Hume). The second requirement is the presence of internal psychophysical 
characteristics, i.e. the capacity to choose according to one’s own preferences 
(along the line of a more recent form of compatibilism)11.  
                                                          
10 Libet 2002, p. 558. 
11 See Kenny 1975 e 1989. For an account of this type of compatibilism, see Magni 2005, 
cap. IV. 




Even if he agent’s choices were completely determined by brain mechanisms, 
the difference between agents who have the opportunity and the capacity to 
choose otherwise and agents who do not have that opportunity and capacity 
would still remain. Even if the agent’s choices were causally determined, it 
would still be true that, at a given moment and in relation to a particular 
choice, he could have chosen otherwise, having both the opportunity and the 
capacity to choose, but, at another time or in relation to another choice, he 
could not have chosen otherwise because, for example, he was physically or 
mentally disturbed. Even in a deterministic universe, it does remain true that I 
could have chosen otherwise, because I was not forced by anyone and in full 
possession of my own mental faculties, while somebody else could not, because 
he was coerced or mentally disabled.  
This version of compatibilism succeeds in explaining the two conditions of 
the notion of free will that we have considered above: the agent’s control of 
choice and the presence of alternate possibilities.  
The control can be identified with the agent’s capacity of choice: an agent 
who has no control over his choice is also unable to choose, and conversely 
those who have no capacity to choose have no control over their own choice. 
As it was noted by Dennett, to have control over something implies being able 
to exercise that control. Such a capacity requires a certain amount of knowl-
edge, so that the degree of knowledge generally reflects the degree of control: 
the more complete is the knowledge, the more complete is the control. And it 
requires a certain capacity to correct one’s behavior, i.e. a capacity of self-
control, which enables the agent to review his or her projects and goals in order 
to obtain a better outcome. But such conditions are compatible with determin-
ism, just as the control of a model aircraft through a radio control is compati-
ble with determinism12.  
 Accounting for the second condition - alternate possibilities - might seem 
more complex. The Consequence Argument used by Van Inwagen to criticize 
compatibilism would show how compatibilism fails to account for this condi-
tion. If determinism is true, according to Van Inwagen, the present state of the 
world necessarily follows from the past state of the world, in connection with 
the laws of nature. An alternate possibility, that is a different state of the 
world, could exist only if the laws of nature or the past states of world could 
change; yet, the agent does not have the power to change the laws of nature, 
which are inescapable, nor to change the past states of the world, which are 
unalterable. The agent could never act and choose otherwise than he has actu-
ally acted or chosen. “If determinism is true – Van Inwagen writes -, then our 
acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. 
                                                          
12 See Dennett 1984, pp. 52 ff e 81 ff. 




But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is up to us 
what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (in-
cluding our present acts) are not up to us”13. 
 Yet, the word ‘power’ is an ambiguous word. The Consequence Argument 
seems to be irrefutable, if we use ‘power’ in Van Inwagen’s sense:  ‘possible’ is 
what is not inconsistent with the past and the laws of nature (something like 
physical modality). But ‘power’ can also be used to mean other modalities: for 
example the so-called ‘dynamic modality’ (opportunity and ability)14. It is 
true, for example, that given the past and the laws of nature, this afternoon I 
cannot take a walk and I am determined to stay at home; however, even in 
such case, it is appropriate to say that, in another sense of the word ‘power’, I 
can take a walk because I am not coerced nor disabled, while somebody else, 
who is coerced and disabled, cannot take a walk, although both of us are de-
termined by the past and the laws of nature.  
The physical modalities of possibility and the dynamic modalities of possi-
bility are indeed different, as it is shown by the fact that they have a different 
logical treatment. Modal logic of capacity does not have two axioms of modal 
logic of possibility. The first is the so-called ‘axiom of possibility’ (ab esse ad 
posse valet consequentia): if something happens, then it must be possible (in 
modal logic: A→PosA). This principle does not hold in relation to capacity: we 
can hit a target at the first shot, but we can do so accidentally and therefore 
without having the capacity. The second is the so-called ‘axiom of distribution 
of possibilities over the disjunction’: it states that if A or B are possible, then A 
is possible or B is possible (in modal logic: Pos(A∨B)→(PosA∨PosB)), and 
even this principle does not apply to capacity. The fact that, upon request, I 
can take a red card or a black card from the deck does not mean that I can 
take a red card upon request or a black card upon request.  
Thus, the modality of the verb ‘power’ which is implied in talking about 
physical impossibility is not the same as that implied in talking about human 
capacity. Even if there exists a strong determinism and the past and the laws 
of nature actually determine our choices, we can talk, in that sense, about al-
ternate possibilities. 
 Holding this view does not mean ignoring the results and methods of scien-
tific knowledge. This kind of compatibilism can indeed be understood in a 
naturalistic way, which explains the agent’s capacity to choose otherwise as a 
result of the evolutionary history of mankind: a trait which was selected in the 
evolution of animal species because it proved to be essential to the process of 
the human animal’s adaptation to its environment15. Furthermore, it allows us 
to speak of degrees of free will and of the possession of a greater or lesser free-
                                                          
13 Van Inwagen 1983, p. 16. 
14 According to Kenny’s terminology, see Kenny 1978, p. 131. 
15 See Dennett 2003. 
Brain Determinism and Free Will 
 
 65
dom to choose, depending on the degree of possession of this capacity of choice. 
Similarly, this kind of compatibilism allows us to explain the acquisition or the 
loss of free will, depending on the increase or decrease of this capacity, and ex-
plains the fact that some capacities may be more fundamental than others, as 
they are the conditions of the possession of more superficial capacities. It 
opens, namely, to the consideration of different levels of capacity, according to 
the dependence of a capacity on the previous possession of other capacities. 
Yet, this kind of compatibilism can do all these things without being tied to 
determinism. Whether determinism is true or false is an empirical question on 
which this type of compatibilism remains agnostic, at least until an unques-
tionable scientific evidence allows us to solve the problem. 
  
 
4. Cerebral determination and responsibility  
 
Since free will is commonly supposed to be a necessary condition for moral (or 
legal, political, etc.) responsibility, if cerebral determination is compatible with 
free will, it is also compatible with the attribution of moral responsibility to 
the agent. Nonetheless, the question of compatibility between determinism 
and freedom has to be kept separate from the question of compatibility be-
tween determinism and responsibility. That is, there are two possible compati-
bilisms (or incompatibilisms): of freedom and of responsibility; and the two 
views do not coincide. While those who hold a compatibilistic view in regard to 
freedom are also compatiblists in regard to responsibility, not all incompati-
bilists in regard to freedom are also incompatibilists in regard to responsibil-
ity16.  
Therefore, the statement that if there were no freedom we could not talk 
about moral responsibility is not a good argument in favour of free will. This is 
so at least for two reasons. First, there may be philosophical counter-
arguments that call this statement into question, as it is shown by a thought 
experiment proposed by Harry Frankfurt: the case of an occult controller. It is 
the case of a person who can remotely control the choices of an agent, because 
she is able to change the agent’s will without the agent being aware. Yet, the 
controller intervenes to change the agent’s will only if it is contrary to his own, 
when the two wills agree the controller does not intervene: in this case the 
agent, who is not coerced by anyone, spontaneously performs the action, and is 
deemed responsible for it. However, even if the agent was held responsible, he 
could not act otherwise, because if he had chosen a different action, the con-
                                                          
16 This is true both for some hard-determinists, who deny free will but not the attribution of 
moral responsibility, both for some libertarians, who are incompatibilists about free will and 
compatibilists about responsibility, as in the case of semi-compatibilism of John Martin 
Fischer: see Fischer 2002, p. 306. 




troller would have intervened and changed his will. Thus, Frankfurt concludes, 
we can be held responsible for any action, even when we do not have the possi-
bility to do otherwise; so we do not have free will17. Such an argument has 
opened a long debate. 
The second reason is a claim which has been not much underlined in the de-
bate of recent years: there is not a single conception of moral responsibility but 
there are at least two, and if, taken in one sense, responsibility may be consid-
ered incompatible with determinism (provided that Frankfurt’s counter-
argument does not work), in the other it does not. The two conceptions are the 
retributionistic view of responsibility and the consequentialistic (pragmatic, 
utilitaristic) view of responsibility. If what matters in the attribution of re-
sponsibility is not the compensation for a merit or a fault (as it is claimed by 
the retributionistic view), but the prevention and correction of behavior (as it 
is claimed by the consequentialistic view), it seems clear that responsibility 
may well coexist with determinism; and, indeed, the deterministic view is one 
that can better explain the effectiveness of attributing responsibility. The at-
tribution of responsibility (of a punishment or a reward) would determine the 
course of future events, preventing or correcting the occurrence of certain ac-
tions. In fact, it was the conception of responsibility most often supported by 
determinists (from Hobbes to, nowadays, Honderich). 
 At this point one might object that only the retributionistic view of re-
sponsibility is appropriate and corresponding to the common conception of re-
sponsibility, and thus it is able to grasp its ultimate or "metaphysical”18 sense. 
But such an objection would assume that we have already solved the problem 
of the justification of responsibility (in favour of a retributionistic view). How-
ever, the choice of which of the two views is the best one is not a choice that 
can be said to be free from general normative assumptions, even though these 
may be often not explicit. This choice depends on the adoption of a specific 
evaluative point of view; it depends on the answer we give to the question of 
which is the right theory to be adopted, the morally correct one. As one of the 
founders of neuroetics recognized, “the concept of responsibility is a social con-
struct that exists in the rules of the society and not in the neuronal structures 
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